

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS LUFKIN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 
\$ CASE NO. 9:06-CR-17

LARON MALLET

\$

# FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA OF TRUE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the District Court, Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter for hearing and the submission of findings of fact and a report and recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(i) and 3583(e). The United States alleges that Defendant, Laron Mallet, violated conditions of supervised release imposed by United States District Judge Ron Clark. The United States Probation Office filed its *Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision* requesting the revocation of the defendant's supervised release

The Court conducted a hearing on October 25, 2011, in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 32 and 32.1. Defendant was present and represented by counsel at the

hearing. Having heard the evidence, this court factually finds that the defendant has violated conditions of supervision and recommends that such violation warrants the revocation of his supervised release.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the Court finds:

- a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the plea of true in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.
- b. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that his plea of true is a knowing and voluntary plea, not the result of force or threats, and that the plea is supported by an independent evidentiary basis in fact establishing each of the essential elements of the conduct.

## STATEMENT OF REASONS

## A. Procedural History

On December 12, 2006, The Honorable Ron Clark, United States District Judge, sentenced Laron Mallet after he pled guilty to the offense of possession with intent to distribute Phencyclidine, a Class C felony. Judge Clark sentenced the defendant to 34 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release subject to the standard conditions of release, plus special conditions to include drug treatment and a \$100 fine. On August 5, 2008, Laron Mallet completed his period of imprisonment and began service of the supervision term.

#### **B.** Allegations in Petition

The United States alleges that the defendant violated a mandatory condition of supervised release in the following manner:

Law Violation (Mandatory Condition): On or about March 4, 2010, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant committed the offense of Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, Penalty Group I, a first degree felony, in violation of Texas Health and Safety Code, Section 481.112. The defendant was indicted in the 263<sup>rd</sup> District Court, Harris County, Texas, cause number 125411. On April 28, 2011, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

#### C. Evidence presented at Hearing:

At the hearing, the Government proffered evidence as its factual basis for the allegations set out *supra*. The Government would present evidence establishing that on April 28, 2011, Laron Mallet pled guilty to the offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in the 263<sup>rd</sup> District Court of Harris County, Texas, and he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for that conviction.

Defendant, Laron Mallet, offered a plea of true to the allegations. Specifically, Mr. Mallet agreed with the evidence presented and pled true to the allegation that he was convicted of that state crime in violation of his supervision conditions in this case.

# D. Sentencing Guidelines; Findings and Recommended Disposition

The allegations, supporting evidence and plea of true warrant revocation of supervised release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Court factually finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a mandatory condition of his supervised release by committing a new

state law violation while on supervised release.

If the Court finds that Mr. Mallet violated his supervision conditions in the manner stated above, this will constitute a Grade A violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). Upon finding a Grade A violation, the Court shall revoke the defendant's supervised release. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1). Based upon the defendant's criminal history category of II and the Grade A violation, the Sentencing Guidelines suggest a sentence of imprisonment for a period ranging from fifteen (15) to twenty-one (21) months. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Because the original offense of conviction was a Class C felony, the statutory maximum imprisonment term upon revocation is two (2) years, less any time the defendant has already served in prison for a previous revocation. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

The Fifth Circuit states that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the revocation of supervised release is advisory only. *See United States v. Cade*, 279 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (citing *United States* v. *Montez*, 952 F.2d 854, 859 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992); *United States v. Headrick*, 963 F.2d 777, 782 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)). Because Chapter 7 was promulgated as an advisory policy statement and there are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release<sup>1</sup>, the Court may impose a greater or lesser sentence upon revocation. *United States v. Gonzalez*, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Further, a sentence imposed for revocation will be upheld unless it is in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. *Id. See also United States v. Pena*, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 1 ("At this time, the Commission has chosen to promulgate policy statements only.")

Here, the evidence and the defendant's own admission supports a finding that he violated his supervision conditions. The Court, therefore, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a Grade A violation of his supervision conditions by committing a new state crime while on supervised release. The defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled true and agreed with the Court's recommended sentence for the violation.

Accordingly, based upon the defendant's plea of true, the agreement of the parties, and the evidence presented in this case, it is the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the plea of true and revoke the defendant's supervised release. The undersigned magistrate judge further recommends that the District Court order Defendant, Laron Mallet, to serve a term of **fifteen (15) months imprisonment** with no further supervision to follow.

#### **OBJECTIONS**

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, *see Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, *see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n.*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (en banc). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate

judge's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

SIGNED this the 27th day of October, 2011.

KEITH F. GIBLIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE